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A move in the right direction? The Model Law against Trafficking in 
Persons and the ILO Operational Indicators  
 
INTRODUCTION 
Despite high levels of interest from a multi-disciplinary audience of academics, governments, 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and other stakeholders, the global response to human 
trafficking continues to be plagued by definitional problems. This is not in spite of, but 
primarily because of, the enactment of the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish 
Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the UN Convention 
against Transnational Organised Crime (United Nations Trafficking Protocol 2000). To its 
credit, the enactment of the Trafficking Protocol in 2000 sought to offer the global community 
the first-ever definition of trafficking and the parameters for who constitutes a victim. What 
resulted, however, was an inaccurate, ill-defined and cumbersome definition that fails to accord 
with the realities of human trafficking.  
An extensive body of academic work has been dedicated to outlining the shortcomings of 
the Trafficking Protocol. Among the most significant problems, the international instrument 
offers only weak accountability mechanisms and loose oversight of its implementation 
(Gallagher 2015); lacks a human rights based approach to trafficking, in practice, 
characterizing human rights as an add-on to the Trafficking Protocol; and through its 
implementation, has exacerbated oppressive measures against sex workers and migrants in the 
name of combating trafficking (Wijers 2015, 56). A number of authors, including myself, have 
critiqued the failure of the Trafficking Protocol to provide explicit clarity on the relationship 
between prostitution/sex work and trafficking (Vijeyarasa, 2015; Ditmore 1998, 43). In brief, 
while the Trafficking Protocol served to clarify a phenomenon that for too long was left 
undefined and unregulated (Gallagher 2015, 16) and outlined obligations that we now, 
admittedly, take for granted, namely criminalising trafficking and protecting victims 
(Gallagher 2015, 16), it unfortunately comes up short as the first and most dominant global 
instrument aimed at tackling the problem. 
These limitations in the definition of trafficking offered by the Trafficking Protocol have 
had significant implications. One of the most obvious from a public policy perspective is its 
emphasis on the use of coercive or forced practices at the point of origin rather than the more 
realistic scenario of deception, fraud and exploitation at the destination. This is despite growing 
evidence of victims’ initial free consent and the reality that, while a decision may have at one 
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point been a free and conscious one, the migrant nonetheless ends up an exploited victim. As 
will be demonstrated below, it is on this question of autonomous or voluntary consent and the 
erroneous emphasis on such concerns as abduction, deception or coercion at the point of origin, 
that the Trafficking Protocol has proved most problematic. What has resulted is a tendency to 
erase from the law those individuals who falls outside the narrowly constructed category of 
victim. 
Partly in response, since 2000, several related international instruments have been drafted, 
two of which are the subject of my analysis in this article. They have been chosen because of 
their global nature and in light of the extent to which they have helped to correct many of the 
shortcomings we originally witnessed in the Trafficking Protocol.  
First, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Model Law against Trafficking in 
Persons (UNODC 2009a) is a tool developed to encourage states to become signatories to the 
Convention against Transnational Organised Crime and to assist States to make amendments 
to their domestic laws to meet the requirements of the Trafficking Protocol. Second, the 
International Labour Office’s Operational Indicators on Trafficking in Human Beings, 
published in 2009, provide practitioners four sets of operational indicators based on expertise 
from twenty-seven European Members States. While neither is a binding legal instrument, both 
act as soft law that have aided in alleviating some of the most egregious problems with how 
trafficking was framed in 2000. 
Several other instruments of international law and policy have made a significant 
contribution to how we understand trafficking and interpret the principles of the Trafficking 
Protocol. This includes the UN Recommended Principles and Guidelines on Human Rights and 
Human Trafficking; the 2005 Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in 
Human Beings; and the 2011 European Union Directive on Preventing and Combating 
Trafficking in Human Beings and Protecting its Victims.1 Among the array of instruments that 
now exist, I have chosen to focus in this article on the Model Law and the ILO Operational 
Indicators in light of the general absence of significant literature on either of these soft law 
instruments, particularly compared to the voluminous literature analyzing binding law in this 
area. Moreover, both the Model Law and ILO Indicators have proved their considerable worth 
in advancing both debates and practice when it comes to human trafficking, particularly at the 
global level. 
In order to analyse the legal instruments discussed in this paper, I offer readers several 
hypotheticals that reflect different levels of autonomy exercised by victims in the process of 
“being trafficked” using both real and hypothetical cases.2 First, I present Chamoli, who is sold 
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by her lover, as the "coerced victim of trafficking".  By virtue of being 16 years of age, and 
therefore a child by definition in international law, Chamoli is a victim of trafficking under 
Article 3 of the Trafficking Protocol. Despite the way in which Chamoli neatly fits the 
Trafficking Protocol, evidence from the field demonstrates that cases like Chamoli’s are rare 
occurrences and represent a very small proportion of trafficking cases. 
Next I present two examples of non-coerced victims. First, we have Hoàng, from Vietnam, 
who chooses to work abroad due to the limited opportunities for work at home and given the 
weight of the expectations she bears to contribute to her family’s income. Next, the autonomous 
victim of trafficking is represented by Patience, a Ghanaian migrant who sees excitement and 
opportunity in Italy, but who is falsely led to expect certain conditions of work abroad that fail 
to come to fruition.3  
Chamoli, Hoàng and Patience illustrate three contrasting experiences pertaining to the 
movement of victims and their experiences of work.  By undertaking this comparative analysis 
of the autonomy of these three victims, I explore the appropriateness of the law when it comes 
to criminalising trafficking. Having spent time in the field collecting data from Ghana, Vietnam 
and Ukraine, I use this experience and first-hand data to espouse that the “autonomous victim”, 
“Patience”, is a more accurate portrayal of a typical victim of trafficking. In turn, I explain why 
Chamoli is not the norm.  
As I will show, a narrow and biased understanding of trafficking shifts our attention to the 
non-autonomous victim, often excluding individuals like “Patience,” the victim-agent, leaving 
them vulnerable to further abuse in a law-enforcement environment. The Model Law and 
Operational Indicators have helped to address these shortcomings. This is both in terms of 
establishing more realistic standards, fitting to address the cases of Hoàng and Patience, but 
also due to the tendency of these newer instruments to emphasise coercion, deception and abuse 
of vulnerability at the point of destination. 
Adopting a feminist legal perspective, my purpose in developing these hypotheticals is to 
examine the limitations of the Trafficking Protocol in accommodating the autonomy exercised 
by victims of trafficking in the process of migrating into exploitative conditions of work. In 
particular, I seek to demonstrate that international law’s treatment of the issue of trafficking 
fails to protect (i.e. define as victims and offer legal redress) the victims whose experiences 
form some of the most common cases of exploitative movement that are taking place on the 
ground. My principle argument is that autonomy is in fact very evident in cases of trafficking. 
It is a central feature in migratory movement: autonomous decisions of willing migrants to seek 
work and betterment abroad. Failure to recognise this results in an inaccurate portrayal of 
   
4 
 
victims’ knowledge, willingness, their expectations of work and life abroad and their right to 
legal redress. In this article, therefore, I seek to identify the strengths in international law when 
it comes to trafficking, the problems that remain and potential solutions, particularly through 
the use of soft law, as to how international law can better reflect trafficking and victimhood.  
Before moving on, two important notes on ‘autonomy’ are required. First, feminist legal 
theory on the topics of trafficking and sex work – a relevant and somewhat related body of 
literature – frequently uses the concepts of agency and autonomy interchangeably. I favour the 
term autonomy over agency, speaking of the victim-agent as an individual whose life choices 
either do or do not demonstrate autonomous decision-making. Second, there is already an 
existing bias within discourses on agency and autonomy towards women.4 Why do we question 
the levels of autonomy exercised by women in decision-making and not the autonomy of all 
victims in the process of moving? I contend that the primary reason has been the dominance in 
these debates of feminist theorists and their focus on the topic of sex work/prostitution and not 
simply autonomy but sexual and bodily autonomy. Throughout this article, I have made a 
deliberate attempt to provide examples pertaining to all forms of labour and to both trafficking 
for sexual and labour exploitation. 
 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE DEFINITION OF VICTIMHOOD 
Before going to the heart of this discussion on the law’s treatment of the autonomy exercised 
by victims of trafficking, it is important to provide some contextual analysis of the three 
international instruments that are the subject of this article. 
 
The UN Trafficking Protocol 
While the international community long ago came to an agreement that human trafficking is 
an egregious violation of human rights (International Agreement for the Suppression of the 
White Slave Traffic 1904), it is arguable that a consensus on the meaning of the term trafficking 
was not reached until 2000. In this respect, the enactment of the Trafficking Protocol was 
unquestionably a pivotal moment in the evolution of a global response to human trafficking. 
Prior to this, various legal instruments (particularly ILO conventions) and resolutions existed 
to govern the issues of forced and child labour, slavery and practices similar to slavery, 
including white slavery and commercial sexual exploitation of children and adults (e.g. 
International Convention for the Suppression of the White Slave Traffic 1910; ILO Convention 
Concerning Forced and Compulsory Labour 1930; ILO Convention Concerning Minimum Age 
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for Admission to Employment 1973). In those instruments, the terms “traffic” or “trafficking”, 
although occasionally mentioned, were never defined. 
In 2000, many in the global community gathered in Palermo, Italy, to discuss and debate 
growing confusion within this field. Clarity was needed on the overlaps and distinctions 
between prostitution and trafficking and between trafficking and migrant smuggling, as well 
as on the relative weight to be accorded to crimes of a sexual and non-sexual nature. This 
moment was preceded by a resolution introduced by the United States of America at the April 
1998 session of the UN Commission for Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, calling for the 
development of a protocol on trafficking in women and children under a proposed UN 
Convention against Transnational Organised Crime. The draft protocol itself was introduced 
by the United States and Argentina at the first negotiation session for the Convention in January 
1999.  
In the lead-up to Palermo, NGOs lobbied member states on the draft language of the 
protocol. Abolitionist feminists and pro-sex work feminists were unsurprisingly divided.5 The 
UN, particularly the UNODC, was at the centre of discussions in Palermo, along with the 
International Organisation for Migration (IOM). The outcome of these discussions was the UN 
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons. The Trafficking Protocol 
defines trafficking as: 
… the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the 
threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse 
of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to 
achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of 
exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of 
others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar 
to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs; … ( 3(a), Trafficking Protocol) 
The Trafficking Protocol’s definition revolves around three separate elements: first, the 
action (“recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons”); second, the 
means; and finally, the purpose of exploitation. For a given situation to be deemed one of 
trafficking, all three elements (action, means and purpose) must be present, with the exception 
of cases involving children (those under 18 years of age). In these instances, no means need to 
be identified (Article 3(a)). That is, the movement of any persons under the age of eighteen for 
the purpose of exploitation is defined as a case of trafficking, regardless of the presence of any 
consent. 
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Unsurprisingly given its annexation to a convention focused on organised crime, the 
Trafficking Protocol adopts a criminal justice perspective towards the prosecution of the 
alleged trafficker. It therefore focuses on both the actions of the trafficker(s) (actus rea) and 
their mental intent, or the purpose of the crime (mens rea). After its enactment, this criminal-
law oriented definition found its way, in various forms, into national legislation and policy 
instruments and is cited in most, if not all, literature as the definition of human trafficking.  
 
The UN Office on Drugs and Crime’s Model Law against Trafficking in Persons 
The UNODC Model Law was the outcome of a project aimed at addressing some of the above 
concerns with the Trafficking Protocol. It emphasises adaptability, the needs of individual 
States and the importance of drafting anti-trafficking provisions that accord with local context 
and that complement and not contradict domestic law. At the same time, alongside the optional 
provisions, there are mandatory ones: these are integral to the operation of the Model Law, 
even if they are “not mandated by the Protocol per se” (UNODC 2009b, 1). 
The Model Law deals extensively with all provisions of the Trafficking Protocol. For the 
sake of this discussion, I deal with the most pertinent suggestions from the Model Law. 
Particularly noteworthy, the Model Law makes a significant departure from the Trafficking 
Protocol by expanding its applicability: “This Law shall apply to all forms of trafficking in 
persons, whether national or transnational and whether or not connected with organized crime” 
(UNODC 2009b, 8). As a point of interest, the Model Law contains a much more expansive 
discussion on the application of measures in a non-discriminatory fashion, naming grounds of 
non-discrimination, such as sexual orientation, that are not explicitly recognised in 
international law.  
The Trafficking Protocol does not provide any guidance regarding a key element of its 
definition of trafficking: the “abuse of power or a position of vulnerability”.6 The Model Law 
assists in this respect, offering several alternatives for wording that emphasise a person 
succumbing because they believe they have “no real and acceptable alternative but to submit” 
(UNODC 2009b, 9) or taking advantage of “the vulnerable position a person is placed in” based 
on a number of factors, including illegal entry into a country, or the lack of proper 
documentation or addiction to the use of any substance. Oddly, “pregnancy” is named as a 
vulnerability factor (UNODC 2009b, 9). I have been unable to find any empirical study 
demonstrating that pregnant women experience a greater likelihood of being trafficked. 
The Model Law contains two potential definitions of the term “coercion”, emphasising both 
physical and psychological harm. It also offers a definition of deception, which as I will 
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demonstrate below, is a central concept in relation to trafficking – and one that, to a certain but 
limited extent could overlap with coercion (Vijeyarasa 2015, 75). 
Finally, the Model Law addresses the much-debated issue of sex work and its relationship 
to trafficking. It explicitly states, “[t]he Protocol addresses the exploitation of prostitution only 
in the context of trafficking” and that “[t]here is no obligation under the Protocol to criminalize 
prostitution” (UNODC 2009b, 13). Importantly the Model Law makes explicit that a particular 
situation in which a victim may have consented can still constitute trafficking, a scenario often 
reflected in qualitative studies of trafficking (see for example Vijeyarasa 2015): 
…It also means, for example, that a person’s awareness of being employed in the sex industry 
or in prostitution does not exclude such person from becoming a victim of trafficking. While 
being aware of the nature of the work, the person may have been misled as to the conditions of 
work, which have turned out to be exploitive or coercive (UNODC 2009b, 26).  
Beyond these select points, the Model Law offers suggested drafting for how to incorporate 
all aspects of the Trafficking Protocol into domestic law. 
 
The International Labour Office’s Operational Indicators on Trafficking in 
Human Beings 
Commonly known as the ILO Operational Indicators on Trafficking in Human Beings 
(henceforth ILO Operational Indicators), this set of indicators actually emerged from joint 
efforts with the European Commission. These indicators were developed using the Delphi 
Method, one that reaches a consensus based on input from a wide range of experts (from each 
of the then 27 EU Member States), including police, government, academia and research 
institutes, NGOs, international organisations, labour inspectorates, trade unions and judiciaries.  
Before outlining the contribution that the ILO Operational Indicators have made, I begin 
with their most obvious shortcoming. The Indicators are a collection of four different sets of 
indicators: (a) Trafficking of adults for labour exploitation; (b) Trafficking of adults for sexual 
exploitation; (c) Trafficking of children for labour exploitation; and (d) Trafficking of children 
for sexual exploitation. Herein lies the problem: the indicators once again affirm a false and 
unnecessary divide between labour and sexual exploitation, risking gravitation towards the 
sexual and salacious and gender stereotypical notions of the protection of women. 
For the purposes of this discussion, I will focus on those indicators related to adult victims 
but the critiques as well as the praise offered in this article in many instances equally apply to 
the child-focused indicators. The ILO states that someone is a victim of trafficking if:  
 two strong indicators apply;  
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 one strong indicator and one medium or weak indicator applies;  
 three medium indicators apply; or  
 two medium indicators and one weak indicator apply.  
This ability to combine indicators with different levels of gravity allows us to identify a wide 
variety of scenarios that fall within the ambit of trafficking. The ILO Operational indicators 
prove useful for the recognition of country-specific circumstances, where certain factors may 
be more present in one country than in another, where they may in fact not be a feature at all. 
For instance, in the Emirates and Saudi Arabia, confiscation of the passports of domestic 
workers, in cooperation with the authorities, is more commonly practiced (Vlieger 2012, 190), 
but may not be a common practice in other regions. 
Undoubtedly as a result of the Trafficking Protocol, certain indicators continue to focus on 
the atypical aspects of human trafficking. This is particularly in relation to coercive recruitment 
for both sexual and labour exploitation. Indicators that include, for instance, abduction, forced 
marriage, selling of victims, isolation and confinement continue to promote a skewed picture 
of trafficking as a coerced and non-autonomous decision and shift attention away from 
exploitation at the destination. Several indicators related to coercion at the destination also 
promote particular assumptions about the experience of being trafficked, such as confiscation 
of documents, isolation and confinement. These may prove problematic if such elements are 
used as criteria for victimhood, without exception. For instance, an analysis of a (limited) body 
of Australian trafficking-related case law suggests that victims often have free movement, 
rarely have their documents taken away and even have access to mobile phones (Schloenhardt 
and Bowcock 2015, 600). 
To their credit, deception is given significant weight among the ILO indicators, with 
particular attention given to deceit about the nature of the job, location or employer. Other 
points of deception provided include the conditions of work, content or legality of the work 
contract, deception about family reunification, housing and living conditions, the legality of 
documentation, or the ability to obtain legal migration status, travel and recruitment conditions, 
wages and earnings, or promises of marriage or adoption. 
Similarly, the indicators show a very accurate picture of exploitation, incorporating 
indicators on exploitation through bad living conditions, excessive working days or hours, 
hazardous work, low or no salary, no respect for labour laws or contracts, no social protection, 
bad working conditions and wage manipulation. Such a picture of exploitation is reflected in 
numerous studies of human trafficking (Busza, Castle, and Diarra 2004, 1370; Agustín 2009, 
   
9 
 
98; Vocks and Nijboer 2000). Interestingly, “coercion at the destination” is given its own 
category – although in reality this is closely intertwined with indicators related to exploitative 
conditions of work – including forced tasks or forced clients and being forced to perform illicit 
or criminal activities. 
A more complicated picture relates to abuse of a position of vulnerability. Limited research 
exists on the pre-departure demographic of victims, with particular characteristics frequently 
presumed to relate to trafficking without substantiation (Vijeyarasa 2015, 8–9). For example, 
increasingly research is debunking the myth that victims are poor and lack education 
(Vijeyarasa 2015, chaps. 5–6). In an effort to be more accurate and specific, the ILO 
Operational Indicators name lack of language as the specific education-related vulnerability 
abused at the recruitment stage. False information about a range of matters is also incorporated, 
including lack of information generally as well as specifically about the law, attitudes of 
authorities and successful migration.  
Abuse of a “difficult family situation” is also named. On this point, I would raise significant 
doubts. On the one hand, social control theory places emphasis on the role of the family in 
providing attachment and a social network, suggesting strong family relationships reduce 
vulnerability to being trafficked (Vijeyarasa 2015, 71; Vocks and Nijboer 2000, 381). 
However, the phrase “difficult family situation” contains vague language; evidence of a sound 
relationship between, for example, domestic violence and trafficking is at best weak 
(Vijeyarasa 2015, 94). We can conclude that while the ILO Operational Indicators have 
advanced our practical conception of what constitutes human trafficking, flaws remain. In the 
following section, I delve further into each of these three legal instruments through the use of 
hypotheticals.  
 
COERCION, AUTONOMY AND THE MIGRANT WORKER: INTERNATIONAL 
LAW’S FRAMING OF THE TRAFFICKING VICTIM 
Conceptions of trafficking have evolved substantially since the enactment of the Trafficking 
Protocol. For many years, trafficking was widely believed to entail the kidnapping, abduction 
and selling of women (Hughes and Denisova 2001; Human Trafficking 2005; Moodysson 
2003; Kara 2010; Skinner 2009; Androff 2011; Balos 2004). However, the degree to which we 
have seen change is debatable. Despite some authoritative voices claiming that the notion that 
trafficking is “concerned solely with the cross-border sexual exploitation of women and 
children has lost all authority” (Gallagher 2015, 16), many authors, including myself, disagree 
(Vijeyarasa, 2015; Wijers 2015, 56; Schloenhardt and Bowcock 2015).  
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This section aims to develop an understanding of what role is played by the international 
legal framework in reinforcing these misconceptions or in challenging them. Do we continue 
to gravitate around the 2000 definition or has our understanding of trafficking and who are the 
victims sharpened as a result of new legal and policy instruments?  
 
The coerced victim of trafficking and international law 
I begin with the case of Chamoli, documented by the then UN Special Rapporteur on Violence 
against women, its causes and consequences, Radhika Coomaraswamy during a 2001 visit to 
Nepal (also cited in Balos 2004 in an article critiquing the use of victims' consent in a 
trafficker's defence7). I present Chamoli as an example of the coerced victim of trafficking: 
 
 ...[Chamoli] was 16, she met a young man and fell in love with him. He promised to marry her 
but insisted that she come away with him to India. So one day she ran away with the 
boyfriend...Once they reached Poona, Chamoli was taken to a house where there was an older 
Nepali lady and many young girls. The lady gave her boyfriend some money and then he told 
her that he was going for a moment. He never came back. Chamoli suddenly realized she had 
been sold into prostitution. She refused to accept her new trade. She was repeatedly beaten. 
She was not given any food. When she screamed in defiance, knives and chilli powder were 
held to her genital area. Finally exhausted and worn down, she agreed to provide sexual 
services. After a few weeks, she was sold to a large brothel in Bombay. She served about 10 
clients every night of the week (Coomaraswamy 2001, ¶ 12). 
 
While the example of Chamoli is not necessarily a case of abduction from start to finish, 
what is key in Chamoli’s narrative is that her decision to elope with her boyfriend cannot be 
equated to a conscious and willing acceptance of her final situation. That is, Chamoli intended 
to elope and live with her boyfriend in India. She did not seek work in India, nor did she have 
expectations or false hopes regarding potential work abroad. While her original decision to flee 
with her boyfriend might be considered a form of autonomous decision-making, she is coerced 
in the sense that, having been sold against her will, at no point did her intention at the outset 
regarding work in India relate in any way to what ended up being her sexual exploitation in a 
brothel in India. 
Chamoli’s story is a classic case under the Trafficking Protocol (and is therefore naturally 
also captured by the Model Law and ILO Operational Indicators which stem from the Protocol). 
She is transferred and harboured by fraud and deception, her vulnerability is clear and her 
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experience of exploitation is perfectly encapsulated in Article 3 of the Trafficking Protocol. 
Moreover, if there is any doubt as to her status as a victim due to her initial decision to 
voluntarily leave Nepal, she is only 16 years of age; as a child, her consent is deemed irrelevant.  
While a “classic” case under the Trafficking Protocol, Chamoli’s story is atypical and 
epitomises the deeply engrained slavery-like imagery that the Trafficking Protocol fostered 
when it was enacted. Problematically, such stories are reiterated, somewhat carelessly, in the 
literature. Siddharth Kara tells readers of fellow Nepalese girl Maya who was sold by her 
parents to a local agent for USD 55, ostensibly to work in a carpet factory. Maya, who Kara 
explains was forced to work in a brothel in Mumbai’s “red light district”, is described by Kara 
as “emblematic of the hundreds and thousands of women and children trafficked and forced 
into prostitution each year” (Kara 2010, 3). Despite criticisms that his literature is a “set of 
speculations” (Cheng 2010, 364) that “relies on salacious material and hero fantasies”, Kara’s 
work is praised by The Financial Times as “an eloquent, campaigning book that addresses an 
evil that belittles our humanity” (Birchall 2009).  
 
The partially autonomous victim of trafficking and international law 
Next I turn to the “partially autonomous” victim. This example attempts to give recognition to 
the decision-making power of the individual migrant and seeks to honour the individual’s stated 
preferences. However, the level of autonomy seemingly exercised by the individual is 
diminished by other socio-economic inequalities that have impacted their decision-making: 
 
Hoàng is a 19-year old Vietnamese woman from An Giang in Vietnam. Her father is ill and 
her mother sells food, toothpaste, toilet paper from a small shop at the back of their house. 
Hoàng has 4 younger siblings and an older brother, who lives and works in Ho Chi Minh City. 
Her mother struggles to cover the costs of books, uniforms and transport to keep her younger 
siblings in school. Hoàng decides to find work in Cambodia. She has heard that there are 
opportunities to work in bars as a waitress. She also knows that some women end up working 
as sex workers in Phnom Penh in Svay Pak and Tuol Kork. Hoàng solicits the help of a friend 
of a friend, who travels regularly to Cambodia and who explains to her that there are plenty 
of opportunities for work in Svay Pak and some girls earn as much as USD500/month, 
significantly higher than the average monthly salary in Vietnam. Together with this 
acquaintance, Hoàng travels to Svay Pak with the hope of finding work at a Karaoke Bar. 
When she arrives at the Karaoke Bar, her acquaintance introduces her to the owner, who offers 
her only USD10/day for a 10-hour working day as a waitress in the bar, significantly less than 
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Hoàng expected. Her acquaintance insists that she pay her a portion of her income for having 
found her work. When Hoàng refuses, the acquaintance threatens to inform her family and 
friends in An Giang that she has become a sex worker in Cambodia (whether true or not). 
Fearing shame on her family, Hoàng agrees to give the acquaintance 10 per cent of her 
earnings.  
 
 This narrative is based, in part, on the fairly extensive empirical research about Vietnamese 
victims of trafficking and Vietnamese sex workers abroad. This includes testimonies 
concerning unmet expectations of trafficked women, particularly related to forced sex work 
and work under a system of debt. Research also reports a complex decision-making process 
that takes into consideration family expectations, financial incentives and personal ambition 
(Busza 2004, 244; Busza, Castle, and Diarra 2004, 1370). Mirroring the partial autonomy 
shown by the Hoàng archetype, Busza further notes, “Some women did not want to enter sex 
work but felt it was a familial responsibility given the lack of other options to earn money; 
others voluntarily migrated to Cambodia for different work but then moved to brothels when 
other options proved difficult. Finally, a few women reported being ‘tricked’ into sex work and 
subsequently forced into debt. These women’s experiences of deception and fraud clearly 
represent ‘trafficking’ and intended exploitation” (Busza 2004, 245).  
In the case of Hoàng, while she clearly exercised a decision to seek work in Cambodia, she 
had a range of options regarding whether or not to leave Vietnam, and she was largely aware 
of the nature of the work she would do as a waitress in Cambodia, her freedom of choice is 
diminished in this narrative. I deem her decisions partially autonomous because they are 
affected by factors that include both familial obligations and weaker socio-economic 
circumstances. 
 It is arguable – and some authorities might argue as such – that Hoàng is not a victim of 
trafficking. Her status hinges largely on how the phrase “abuse of power or position of 
vulnerability” in the Trafficking Protocol is understood. It is here that we see the real value of 
the Model Law. Does Hoàng feel she has “no reasonable alternative but to submit to the labour 
or services” (UNODC 2009b, 10) being demanded of her? No reasonable alternative is a high 
standard, one that Hoàng probably does not meet. However, her acquaintance takes advantage 
of her illegal status in Cambodia. Moreover, she is threatened. The term “threat” appears only 
once in the Trafficking Protocol in Article 3. The Model Law helpfully describes “forced labour 
or services” as “all work or service that is exacted from any person under the threat of any 
penalty and for which the person concerned has not offered him- or herself voluntarily” 
   
13 
 
(UNODC 2009b, 14). Threats to expose Hoàng’s work to her family may meet this 
requirement. 
Turning to the ILO Operational Indicators, and the indicators focused on trafficking of 
adults for labour exploitation, Hoàng is in fact very knowledgeable and is unlikely to meet the 
requirements for deceptive recruitment, coercive recruitment or recruitment by abuse of 
vulnerability. Much of her exploitation occurs at the destination point after she has voluntarily 
travelled to Cambodia – a scenario that, based on my past research, I believe to be more typical 
of trafficking cases. In this case, three medium indicators are evident: she faces a low salary, 
with no respect for labour laws and no social protection. In addition, she faces a dependency 
on her exploiter, is living in an unknown area and has an economically-weak family situation, 
again meeting the requirement of three medium-level indicators for abuse of vulnerability at 
the destination. Hoàng’s case proves well the value-add of the Model Law and ILO Operational 
Indicators. 
Turning now to another hypothetical example of partially autonomous victimhood, here I 
move beyond the often typical portrayal of victims of trafficking as single, young women 
entering sex work. This example helps to further clarify the test for partially autonomous 
decision-making. 
 
Đặng and Bùi are a Vietnamese couple from Bắc Giang Province in Red River Delta in Vietnam 
with 2 children. Together they live with Đặng’s mother and father in an agrarian community. 
They are both farmers, growing rice on land owned by the government but allocated to them 
for cultivation. Đặng has a brother who received a scholarship to study in Russia and later 
moved to Western Europe and found a job. He has heard that the work opportunities are 
acceptable. Both Đặng and Bùi decide to try to find work in Europe for a few months, with the 
hope of maybe later sending over their children and staying in Europe permanently or 
returning to Vietnam with a bit more money for their family. They have a Vietnamese friend 
who, with the help of a friend in neighbouring China, managed to leave Vietnam and find work 
in Spain. Their Vietnamese friend puts them in touch with the Chinese acquaintance. After 
considerable negotiations and many months, the Chinese acquaintance arranges their passage 
and work in a factory in Spain. They are told that they will work between 8-10 hour days, 5-6 
days a week and are reassured that it is easy to find accommodation with other Vietnamese 
living in Spain. Although they expected to pay for their own passage and an additional fee of 
USD 3,000 to the Chinese contactor, upon arrival in Spain, a debt of USD30,000 is imposed 
on the couple instead. Further, upon arriving at the factory, they discover that they have no 
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choice but to sleep on a dirty mattress in the factory, where they must also eat and use the 
toilet. They also discover that they must work 18 to 20 hour days, with no days off. They have 
no idea how long it will take them to pay off their debt or whether they can escape. They worry 
about their children whom they have left behind and question how their elderly parents will be 
able to care for them in their absence.8 
 
Both Đặng and Bùi are a partially autonomous trafficked couple, whose decision-making is 
limited by their political and socio-economic context. While their story differs from Hoàng in 
many significant ways, there are numerous and important parallels when it comes to elucidating 
the meaning of “autonomy”. Clearly their lives and livelihoods in Vietnam are constrained by 
their social and political context, including Vietnam’s (newly-emerging) middle-income status, 
the Communist system in which they are unable to own land in their own right, and the limited 
income available from the agrarian economy. Perhaps too their capacity for autonomous 
decision-making is also weak, the couple relying heavily on the path taken by Đặng’s brother. 
They are also limited by their obligations concerning the care of their children but also their 
responsibilities towards Đặng’s mother and father.  
Under the Trafficking Protocol, Đặng and Bùi are recruited and travel to Spain under 
deceptive conditions. Abduction and coercion are irrelevant. The word debt or phrase ‘debt 
bondage’ was not explicitly included in the Trafficking Protocol. This is a stark omission that 
has not received the severe criticism it deserves.9 In contrast, the Model Law offers several 
alternative definitions of “debt bondage”, including one that draws from the Supplementary 
Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar 
to Slavery, Article 1: 
(a) Debt bondage, that is to say, the status or condition arising from a pledge by a debtor of his 
personal services or of those of a person under his control as security for a debt, if the value of those 
services as reasonably assessed is not applied towards the liquidation of the debt or the length and 
nature of those services are not respectively limited and defined (Supplementary Convention on the 
Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery 1957; see 
also Vijeyarasa and Bello y Villarino 2013 for more on the Slavery Convention). 
Again, the detailed elucidation of the notion of abuse of vulnerability in the Model Law and 
ILO Operational Indicators prove particularly helpful. Specifically with respect to the latter, 
Đặng and Bùi have suffered deceptive recruitment (three medium indicators present – deceived 
   
15 
 
as to conditions of work, housing and living conditions, wages and earnings and possibly also 
about family reunification); recruitment by abuse of vulnerability (at least three medium 
indicators present – vulnerability related to a difficult family situation, economic reasons, false 
information about successful migration, their family and personal situations); exploitation at 
the destination (strong indicators of excessive working days and hours, as well as numerous 
medium indicators – bad living conditions, no respect for labour laws, no social protection and 
very bad working conditions); and arguably coercion at the destination (two strong indicators 
– debt bondage and isolation in an unknown country where they probably do not speak the 
language). The experience of Đặng and Bùi is therefore well reflected by the ILO Operational 
Indicators. 
 
The autonomous victim of trafficking and international law 
Finally, I turn to the trafficked agent whom I deem to be an “autonomous victim”, having 
voluntarily entered into what unexpectedly ends in trafficking-like conditions: 
 
Patience, from Takoradi, Ghana, is introduced to smuggler “A” by a good friend, who vouches 
for his reliability. “A” offers to organise Patience’s passage to Milan, Italy and her work upon 
arrival for USD10,000. Patience decides to accept A’s offer, as does her friend, as it sounds 
like a fun opportunity and a good way to earn some money. Patience knows she will be working 
as a sex worker in a brothel, and expects to work 6 days/week from around 9pm to 4am, for 
which she will earn around USD2,000 per month. Before leaving Ghana, Patience pays “A” 
USD4000, as a deposit for his help. Having arrived in Milan, as planned, Patience begins 
works in A’s brothel. However, during her first week of work, Patience is told that “A will keep 
50 per cent of her earnings. As a result, she earns only USD 1,000 per month, all of which she 
must give to “A” in order to pay off her debt. During her first month of work, “A” insists that 
she works 7 days/week, claiming that she is not seeing enough clients. Occasionally Patience’s 
clients become abusive but she is offered no protection from the brothel. On more than one 
occasion, she is forced to have sex with without a condom and is unable to deny the insistent 
demands of clients, with “A” refusing to turn away abusive clients. She sleeps in a near-by 
share house, with several other women who also work at the brothel. The house is guarded by 
a security guard who is paid by “A” and prevents any of the women from leaving the house at 
night. After 3 months of working at the brothel, she is tired, frequently ill, and still owes “A” 
USD3,000 before she can begin to earn an income of her own.  
 
   
16 
 
Patience is the “autonomous trafficked agent-victim”. The example moves away from the 
paradigmatic image of the young and naïve innocent girl lured by evil traffickers that is often 
criticised in the academic literature by pro-sex worker feminists (Doezema 1999). Patience 
chose to earn money as a sex worker and was aware that she would be working in the Italian 
sex industry before leaving Ghana, as is said to be frequently the case with undocumented 
migrant women sex workers in Europe (Agustín 2005, 101–2; Busza 2004, 244). While her 
autonomy is clear in her initial decision, her situation changed from being a migrant sex worker 
to a migrant victim of trafficking when her negotiated expectations of work in Italy do not 
come to fruition, ranging from her rate of pay, the debt imposed on her as well as her living 
conditions. These are the “unmet expectations” that are frequently central to the experience of 
human trafficking; Patience is a “voluntary victim” of trafficking (Vijeyarasa 2010).  
Patience is unsuccessful in her migratory pursuits. Yet, her voluntary decision-making and 
knowledge places her outside of the scope of many domestic trafficking laws. To the contrary, 
she is likely to be viewed by the law as smuggled migrant. Again, the absence of references to 
debt bondage in the Trafficking Protocol severely undermines her legal rights. 
The Model Law, however, offers her greater protection by escaping the difficult language 
of “the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons”. Patience is 
deceived and exploited at the destination point and her vulnerability has been abused. Her 
vulnerability arises from her precarious status, having entered and stayed in Italy illegally 
(UNODC 2009b, 10). Her case is one of debt bondage and as per the earlier discussion of Đặng 
and Bùi, meets the definitional requirements of debt bondage as set out in the Model Law. 
Concerning the ILO’s Operational Indicators, her experience of trafficking was at the 
destination point. She is a victim of exploitation (meeting several medium indicators – 
hazardous work, no salary, lack of respect for labour laws, no social protection and very bad 
working conditions); she has suffered coercion at the destination (several strong indicators 
including debt bondage, forced clients, confinement and surveillance and potentially several 
medium indicators, including the threat of even worse working conditions); and has suffered 
abuse of vulnerability at the destination (including three medium indicators – the difficulty of 
living in an unknown area, her illegal status and precarious relationship with authorities and 
arguably her dependence on her exploiters). From this example, we can see how voluntariness 
can be used to exclude a victim from the law’s protection, despite evident violations of their 
rights; the Protocol’s failure to recognize nuance and the realities behind the practice of 
trafficking marginalizes victims to the point of pushing them beyond the law’s protection. 
 




This article demonstrates the shortcomings of the Trafficking Protocol – which are well 
documented, albeit not as well examined in terms of concrete hypotheticals that depict real-
world scenarios of trafficking as has been attempted in this article. Three different framings of 
the agency exercised in the trafficking process are offered above: first, Chamoli, who is sold 
by her lover, representing the kidnapped, abducted victim; secondly, Hoàng and the couple, 
who choose to work abroad due to limited opportunities for work at home and given the weight 
of familial obligations, and Patience, who sees excitement and opportunity in Italy, but is 
falsely led to expect certain conditions of work abroad that fail to come to fruition.  
I have articulated these three approaches to “autonomy” for two reasons. The cases of 
Chamoli, Hoàng (and Đặng and Bùi) and Patience allow us to view the different levels of 
autonomy involved in the decision-making that exists behind many experiences of trafficking. 
Much greater autonomy exists than is often conceded. Second, these cases illustrate the often-
criticised problems with how trafficking and its victims are framed in the Trafficking Protocol. 
In response, both the Model Law and the ILO Operational Indicators have substantially 
advanced our theoretical, legal and practical response to the issue of trafficking. 
At the time of its enactment, the Trafficking Protocol situated trafficking within the realm 
of criminal justice, largely unapologetically. At that time, States’ primary interests were in 
ending trafficking as a form of transnational organised crime. The rights of victims to redress 
were explicitly brought into the discussion but were never the core focus of the issue. A 
multiplicity of experiences that are actually involved in trafficking-related exploitation was 
therefore largely unrepresented.  
This article highlights the importance of recognising such a spectrum of migratory 
experiences, with differing degrees of autonomy, consent, deception and exploitation. 
Wherever an individual is placed on the migration spectrum, common experiences include 
arduous journeys, low wages, hazardous working environments and unsanitary living 
(Vijeyarasa 2015, 180). Chamoli, Hoàng, Đặng and Bùi and Patience all sit at different points 
of the spectrum and yet the law – depending on how it is drafted – may preclude victims who 
parallel these examples from being identified as a victim and receiving redress. To be 
simultaneously a victim and an agent of one’s destiny should not be impossible under the law. 
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1 A more expansive short-list of relevant binding instruments would also take into account the ILO Conventions 
that specifically deal with forced labour, including ILO Convention No. 29 on Forced Labour; ILO Convention 
No. 105 on the Abolition of Forced Labour; and ILO Convention No. 182 on the Worst Forms of Child Labour. 
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2 I use hypotheticals not to be directive but rather to open up questions for inquiry. Each hypothetical is drawn 
from the literature and also stories shared with me during my fieldwork in Ghana, Vietnam and Ukraine. They are 
intended to be archetypes rather than suggest that any individual hypothetical is a standalone true-life example. 
3 I recognise that Patience, the autonomous individual, is a falsehood. No decision can be deemed entirely 
autonomous. It is impossible to frame the decision of a female African migrant to seek work abroad as entirely 
autonomous, free of any gendered, cultural, racial or ethnic implications. However, for the purpose of this 
discussion, I frame Patience as an autonomous decision-maker. 
4 There are exceptions. See for example Ronit D. Leichtentritt 2005 on young male street workers in Israel or 
McCabe et al. 2011 on male street workers in Dublin. 
5 Abolitionists call for an end to prostitution and trafficking alike. Pro-sex work feminists distinguish the 
voluntariness of sex work from trafficking. Throughout this article, I use the terms “prostitute” and “sex worker” 
interchangeably to remain true to the original passage and the preferred term of the author(s) being discussed or 
cited. My preferred terminology is “sex work” as a reflection that women voluntarily involved in sex work seek 
recognition of this work as a legitimate livelihood choice. 
6 The phrase itself is problematic, creating the image of a vulnerable woman or child targeted by perpetrating 
males. 
7 Balos’ argument, while also focusing on women’s choice and consent, is completely contrary to what I argue 
in this article. As an abolitionist, seeking an end to prostitution and trafficking, Balos argues that any attention to 
women’s choices and consent ‘obscures the systemic inequality that facilitates trafficking and the sexual 
exploitation of women’ at 140. 
8 This example is partially based on the discovery of a network of human traffickers who were accused of using 
the forced labour of around 450 Chinese men and women in 80 textile sweatshops in Catalonia, Spain. See CNN 
Freedom Project, “Unravelling the web of Spain’s sweatshops”, 
http://thecnnfreedomproject.blogs.cnn.com/2011/07/05/undercovers-crack-slave-labor-gang/, 5 July 2011. The 
example is also based on information provided to me during my own field research in Ukraine regarding a 
Ukrainian couple who left their child in Ukraine under the care of their parents after travelling to find work in 
Portugal. The husband ended up in exploitative labour in a factory, while the wife was forced to provide domestic 
services for the factory owner, who repeatedly raped her, before they were discovered, deported and received 
financial assistance from IOM in Ukraine. 
9 The Travaux Préparatoires indicate that ‘debt’ and ‘debt bondage’ were discussed but largely assumed to come 
within the meaning of the phrase ‘forced labour’. See (United Nations 2006). 
